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CORRESPONDENCE
Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism
Mark P. Gergen*

Recently in this journaP Donald Regan published a pair of essays
on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America. 2 Much of the first essay
elaborates his theory that what the Supreme Court should be doing
and w.hat it is doing3 under the dormant commerce clause is checking
state laws adopted with a substantial protectionist purpose.4 The rest
of the first essay and all of the second essay develop a different check
on state lawmaking power in interstate affairs: a rule that states may
not regulate conduct beyond their borders. He calls this the extraterritoriality principle. Elsewhere I have questioned whether Regan's theory of protectionism is sufficient to explain what the Court is and
should be doing under the dormant commerce clause. 5 Here I want to
question the extraterritoriality principle. My argument is that it
works poorly, if it works at all, as a check on the regulatory authority
of states. I also make the broader point that Regan's two proposals
are overly formal. They blind us to what should be our real concerns
when reviewing state laws that affect out-of-state interests and may
generate an intolerable number of bad results. At the end I briefly
sketch an alternative approach to these problems that is more openended.
Regan initially states the extraterritoriality principle vaguely:
"For the most part, states may not legislate extraterritorially,
whatever exactly that means." 6 If this is all there were to the principle
it would be uninteresting. But he adds a critical gloss: what states
may not do is directly regulate behavior beyond their borders. 7 This
• Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. - Ed. Doug Laycock provided
invaluable criticism.
1. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987).
2. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
3. See 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. This is developed at length in Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
5. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEXAS L. REV. (1988) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Selfish State]; Gergen, Equality and the Conflict ofLaws, 73 IOWA L. REV. (1988) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Conflict of Laws].
6. Regan, supra note 1, at 1896.
7. Id. at 1899.
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rule has two components. First, states may indirectly influence foreign behavior by acting upon its local effects. Michigan, for example,
may influence Indiana polluters by making them liable for emissions
that poison Michigan air. Second, states may not regulate foreign behavior directly. Regan's example of the difference between direct and
indirect regulation of foreign behavior is hard to improve on. Michigan may ban cigarette smoking within its borders whatever the effect
of the prohibition on southern industry. Michigan may not directly
prohibit the manufacture of cigarettes in North Carolina. 8
The distinction between direct and indirect extraterritorial regulation is what makes Regan's proposal different from other territorialist
theories. The problem with most territorialist theories is that once we
allow states to regulate foreign behavior because of the local effects of
such behavior, a power states clearly enjoy today, nearly all extraterritorial laws pass constitutional scrutiny. After all, states really care
about regulating foreign behavior only when it affects them. 9 Regan
puts some teeth back into the territorial principle by denying states the
power to regulate foreign behavior directly whatever its local effects. 10
This is the heart of Regan's theory. He refers to the distinction
between regulating local and foreign behavior to explain why the
Court may have been right in CTS and in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 11
respectively upholding and striking down Indiana and Illinois laws
regulating tender offers. Both laws imposed restrictions on transfers
of corporate stock in tender offers. For Regan the important difference between the two cases is that the Indiana law regulated only
tender offers for firms incorporated in the state while the Illinois law
also regulated offers for firms doing substantial business in the state
but incorporated elsewhere. 12 Having decided that transfers of corporate stock occur in the state of incorporation, 13 Regan concludes that
Indiana was regulating internal behavior within its sphere of authority
8. Id. at 1899-900.
9. The only hard cases under an effects principle are those where citizens of states travel
abroad, are injured, and then return home and claim the protection of their home state's laws or
courts. The power of states to act even in these cases may be squeezed under an effects principle;
indeed, it is hard to keep it out because the local implications of foreign injuries are hard to
distinguish from other jurisdictional effects. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra note S.
10. It is somewhat ironic that while making a plea for territorialism, Regan agrees that states
may regulate their citizens when they go abroad. Regan, supra note 1, at 1906-10. I tend to
agree with him that states do and should have such power. See Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra
note 5. This raises the question whether states may regulate out-of-slaters to protect citizens
from injury when they travel to other states. Regan d?es not consider this issue.
11. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
12. Regan, supra note 1, at 1897, 1899.
13. Id. at 1878-79.
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while Illinois was regulating foreign stock transfers. 14
But Regan's extraterritoriality principle is ultimately a poor tool
for defining the limits of state power in interstate matters. The principle does not seriously restrain the states. Whatever ends a state might
wish to accomplish by directly regulating foreign behavior usually can
be met by indirect regulation. To take Regan's hypothetical Michigan
cigarette ban, by making it a crime, punishable by death, to manufacture a cigarette that finds its way into Michigan, the state may accomplish much the same thing as directly prohibiting cigarette
manufacture in North Carolina. Faced with such a risk, cigarette
plants across the nation would quickly be closed by their owners. If
this seems far-fetched, consider the effectiveness of punitive damage
remedies for defectively designed products used in-state as a means of
directly regulating the manufacture of products abroad. Or consider
the law in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority. 15 It required liquor wholesalers to affirm that they would
sell liquor nationally at a price no higher than they sold it in the state
in the preceding month. The Supreme Court struck down the law, the
correct result in Regan's view because of the extraterritoriality principle.16 New York was impermissibly reaching out directly to regulate
the price at which liquor is sold outside the state. But New York
could accomplish much the same end by making the law retrospective,
requiring liquor wholesalers to charge no more for sales in-state than
they charged nationally in the preceding month. This saves the law
from the extraterritoriality objection (as Regan observes) 17 because
such a law does not directly regulate foreign pricing. 18
One may even purge the taint of extraterritoriality from Illinois's
law seeking to influence shifts in ownership or corporations doing substantial business in the state but incorporated elsewhere. Directly reg14. Other scholars consider these decisions hard to reconcile. See, e.g., Langevoort, The
Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on crs Corp. v. Dynamics

Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97 (1987).
15. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
16. Regan, supra note 1, at 1903.
17. Id. at 1905.
18. In Brown-Forman the Court limited its decision to prospective pricing laws. It had earlier upheld a retrospective law in Joseph E. Seag:arn & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35
(1966). Whether Seagram remains valid is unclear. The Brown-Forman Court said: "(W]e do
not necessarily attach constitutional significance to the difference between a prospective statute
and the retrospective statute at issue in Seagram. Indeed, one could argue that the effects of the
statute in Seagram do not differ markedly from the effects of the statute at issue in the present
case." 476 U.S. at 584 n.6. This broadening of the rule in Brown-Forman is fatal to Regan's
proposal. If the extraterritorial effects of regulating local behavior give rise to constitutional
objections, a host oflaws becomes suspect and some sort of balancing will be necessary to tell the
good from the bad.
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ulating stock transfers is barred if we agree with Regan that they take
place in the state of incorporation. But Illinois may regulate the local
effects . of changes in corporate ownership. If the state fears local
plants will close and assets will be taken outside the state, it may prohibit such actions if they closely follow a takeover that violates stipulated standards. The regulation's direct effect is internal; it only
indirectly discourages tender offers (and so stock transfers) outside the
state. 19
In the case of laws not drafted to avoid the principle it may be
difficult to tell whether what is being regulated is extraterritorial behavior or its local effects. Consider a libel law: does it penalize the
libelous utterance made outside the state or its publication in the state?
What if a speaker's good faith is made an absolute defense? Does that
make the law more a regulation of foreign behavior since now it speaks
directly to foreign behavior? Or consider a law that imposes civil liability for polluting state water. Is it regulating the act of polluting or
the in-state effect? One would probably say the latter, but what if the
law makes it a defense that the polluter used the best available technology? Now it seems to be directly regulating out-of-state behavior.
Some laws regulate intangible things which occur in no particular
place. Applying the principle then depends upon the fictional location
of the thing regulated. Regan considers one such problem at length:
locating transfers of corporate stock. 20 Another example is state laws
regulating interstate consumer credit. 21 Whether such laws seek to
regulate in-state or out-of-state behavior depends upon the fictional
location of contract formation, an issue that never was satisfactorily
resolved in choice of law.
If jurists apply the territorial principle mechanically, focusing on
whether laws regulate local effects or foreign causes by examining
their objective form, these problems will be resolved in ways that often
seem arbitrary and incorrect. Consider an out-of-state lender who
specifies that its advertisements are solicitations of offers and that loan
19. It is not clear that Regan would strike down all such laws as protectionist under the
co=erce clause. He suggests that laws may not be protectionist if states adopt them because
they think it would be better for all states if industry was less mobile. Regan, supra note 1, at
1871-72. How to deal with selfish policies pursued by states for nonselfish reasons is a perplexing
problem for a motive-based theory. I suggest elsewhere that this same issue is posed by the
interest-based approach to choice oflaw. There I conclude that while it is not so bad if states act
selfishly for honorable reasons, the point is of little practical consequence because it is hard to
distinguish in practice between evil and benign acts of selfishness. Gergen, Conflict of Laws,
supra note 5.
20. Regan, supra note l, at 1876-79.
21. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code extends restrictions on charges to loans made by
residents outside states. UCCC § l.201(7)(a) (1974).
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applications will be accepted, and loans made, at its home-office. A
judge who mechanically applies the principle that states may not directly regulate foreign behavior could strike down a law regulating
such an out-of-state loan. This would be required by the principle of
extraterritoriality, taken literally, but it is bad constitutional law.
Regan recognizes that it is often difficult to tell whether a law regulates local or foreign behavior. Speaking of the specific problem of
locating transfers of corporate stock (or other intangible things) Regan
argues, "This is the sort of difficulty formalism leads to. In the end,
some hard cases must simply be decided by judicial intuitions concerning the spirit of the Constitution."22 He concludes that stock transfers
occur in the state of incorporation for the sensible, policy-based reason
that some state (but only one state) should be able to regulate corporate transfers. The state of incorporation is as likely a candidate as
any. 23 Be clear what Regan is doing. He resolves the familiar problem
of indeterminacy by telling the Court to consider what is good policy
at the levels of formulating principle and of classifying laws (or the
behavior they regulate) as internal or extraterritorial. The principle of
extraterritoriality is little more than a facade, at least in hard cases,.
behind which the Court will decide cases on the basis of "intuitions
concerning the spirit of the Constitution."
This is worse than balancing (Regan's bete noire) for several reasons. Regan would require courts to express decisions in terms that
have nothing to do with our real concerns. Laws regulating tender
offers, for example, would seem to rise or fall not on the weight of the
state interest served and the burden to the nation, but rather on the
fictional placement of stock transfers. Decisions will be less candid if
they do not explain the real reasons why the principle was applied in a
particular fashion. This makes decisions less persuasive. It mystifies
those who do not know that the application of the principle of territoriality in specific cases depends upon "judicial intuitions concerning
the spirit of the Constitution." Perhaps worst of all, some jurists may
take the principle literally and strike down good laws because they
seem to regulate foreign behavior directly. If there were few hard
cases, or if the distinction between direct and indirect extraterritorial
regulation was relevant to any real concern, these problems with Regan's proposal would be tolerable. But, as we have seen, many cases
will be hard because there is no clear distinction between regulating
foreign behavior and regulating its local effects.
22. Regan, supra note 1, at 1879.
23. Id. at 1878-79.
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Regan's version of territoriality has little to do with our real concerns. Territorialism rests on the belief that the essential division of
authority between states is territorial, and, in some more extreme versions, that this division of authority carries with it the ideal that every
event is subject to only one authority. 24 The ideal of singular sovereignty is unattainable, of course, for it is inevitable in a world where
behavior touches several states that each sovereign will claim the authority to act upon it. But even if we wanted a territorialist system
with singular sovereignty, Regan's direct/indirect distinction is not a
reasonable way to allocate power. If an Indiana polluter poisons
Michigan air, whether Michigan properly regulates his behavior has
nothing to do with how directly it acts upon the out-of-stater. What
matters is the weight of Michigan's interest in the out-of-state behavior. Indeed, making directness relevant has the perverse effect, noted
earlier, that Michigan could impose strict liability for polluting its air
but it could not make the foreign polluter's use of the best available
technology a defense.
This brings us to a broader criticism of Regan's approach to the
problem of limiting the power of states in interstate matters. This goes
not only to his principle of territoriality (which Regan proposes tentatively), but also to his more important proposal that in enforcing the
dormant commerce clause the Supreme Court should be concerned
only with checking laws adopted with a substantial protectionist purpose (to enrich local commercial interests at the expense of foreign
interests). I have explained in some detail the problems with this proposal elsewhere and will only summarize the argument here. While a
concern with protectionism is a vital part of the law, it is not sufficient
to explain what the Court is doing or should be doing. Many state
laws adopted with the likely purpose of enriching locals at the expense
of out-of-staters (examples include subsidies to local industry, quarantines or embargoes of infected goods, and reciprocal laws) are tolerated. 25 At the same time, some laws will be struck down despite their
nonprotectionist motives (examples include a tariff adopted to raise
revenues and an embargo adopted to protect the environment). 26
Looking at this pattern, and asking what is our real concern when
states make laws that affect out-of-state interests, it seems to me that
24. This is Doug Laycock's territorialist manifesto. Regan comes close to saying this when
he reasons that territorialism is implicit in the geographic division of sovereignty, Regan, supra
note l, at 1887-95, and, more importantly, when he insists an important function of the territoriality principle is to ensure that events are regulated by one, but only one, sovereign. Id. at 1882,
25. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5; Gergen, Selfish State, supra note 5.
26. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5.
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what we want to check is state laws of disutility, or laws that enrich
states but at greater expense to out-of-staters or the nation. A concern
with protectionism is consistent with this, for, as Regan observes, laws
adopted with a purpose of enriching citizens at the expense of out-ofstaters are likely to be inefficient. 27 This also explains why subsidies,
quarantines, and reciprocal laws may be tolerated, for either they are
likely to be of positive utility (quarantines enhance the general welfare
by preventing the spread of disease), or it is impossible to craft a rule
prohibiting them that would not imperil laws of positive utility (subsidies such as hire-local laws should be tolerated because they cannot be
distinguished from public employment programs). And it explains
why we must sometimes prohibit laws though their motive is not evidently protectionist. States may injure out-of-staters, and harm the
nation as a whole, by adopting laws with disregard for out-of-state
interests, as well as by consciously trying to take advantage of such
interests.
Regan is not blind to these problems. Sometimes he manipulates
the principles to avoid bad results. For example, in the case of grossly
uneven but well-motivated laws (tariffs adopted to raise revenues or
en;ibargoes adopted to protect the environment) Regan is willing to
assume their motive is bad without regard to the actual evidence.28
And he saves subsidies from the rule by fiat: only laws "analogous in
form to the traditional instruments of protectionism" are prohibited. 2 9
(This is akin to his proposal that the location of geographically indeterminate acts, like stock transfers, be defined with an eye to what is
the most sensible rule.) But other times the rigidity of the principles
forces unattractive, and probably unnecessary, outcomes. For example, by prohibiting only traditional forms of protectionism Regan
would allow certain subsidies, such as preferences for citizens in the
sale of goods by state-owned plants, that could and should be stopped
under a more flexible standard. Jo
This may not be bad. We may be so concerned that the Court will
take advantage of a license to balance that we want to force it to work
within fairly rigid principles that constrain its discretion. If there is a
justification for Regan's principle of protectionism, it is this.
But there may be a better approach. Establish the principle that it
is not the province of the Court to weigh closely the costs and benefits
27.
28.
note 5.
29.
30.

Regan, supra note 4, at 1115-20.
Id. at 1119-23. I explore this inconsistency at length in Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra
Regan, supra note 4, at 1095.
Gergen, Selfish State, supra note 5.
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of laws. When state laws are challenged, the primary issue is whether
their motive was substantially protectionist. But do not close the system there. Though the motive of a law seems bad, let it be upheld if
the state can make a strong showing that its benefits outweigh its
costs. In undertaking this analysis pay close attention to precedent. If
a law is the sort of protectionist law that has been tolerated in the past
(e.g., a subsidy, quarantine, or reciprocal law), the Court should incline to uphold it. This makes incremental change in either direction
possible. If a law is on the margin of something traditionally allowed
- for example, a preference for citizens in sales of goods from stateowned plants - but it seems inefficient, precedent should not save it.
Ultimately, the traditional rule, if it is a bad one, will be eaten away.
Conversely, though a law seems a product of no ill will, the Court
should not be reluctant to strike it down if it seems the costs greatly
outweigh the benefits. Again, attention should be paid to whether it is
the sort of law, such as an embargo, which is usually forbidden.
This is not that different from Regan's theory of protectionism.
(His principle of territoriality I would discard entirely.) It just takes
the concern of utility (or efficiency) that informs much of his analysis
and brings it closer to the front. The major difference is that rather
than saying the Court should never balance, I say that it may sometimes do so. But it must be careful not to second-guess plausible policy judgments and be mindful of the need not to vary too far, too fast,
from precedent. The advantages are twofold. Perhaps, there will be
less error. Definitely, cases will be argued and decisions reasoned on
the basis of the factors actually relevant to how we want them decided.

